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I. INTRODUCTION
BIOETHICS scholars applauded the Cruzan v. Director, MissouriDepartment of Health1 decision for encouraging the creation of“mechanisms to safeguard the interests of people who become in-
capacitated at the end of life.”2 The legacy of the Cruzan decision is wider
reaching than early literature suggests. At its core, Cruzan is about an
incapacitated person’s fundamental liberty interest to be free of un-
wanted medical treatment and the role of the government in defining a
process to protect that right.3 The reasoning in Cruzan impacts a patient
population that includes both those who were previously capacitated and
others who were never capacitated. It affects an incapacitated individual’s
liberty interest to receive the kinds of medical treatment they could
choose if capacitated. In this article, the authors review the case of a
never capacitated patient in light of the Cruzan decision to consider the
intended and unintended consequences of legal requirements created by
New York State (NYS) to safeguard the interests of patients with intellec-
tual and developmental disabilities (IDD). Inconsistent with the funda-
* The authors are from the Schyve Center for Biomedical Ethics, Division of Medi-
cal Humanities and Bioethics, University of Rochester School of Medicine and Dentistry,
Rochester, New York.
1. 497 U.S. 261 (1980).
2. Sara Taub, Departed, Jan 11, 1983; At Peace, Dec 26, 1990, AMA J. ETHICS (Nov.
2001), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/commemorative-issue-departed-jan-11-
1983-peace-dec-26-1990/2001-11 [https://perma.cc/42XN-L6HG].
3. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277–79; see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22
(1990); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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mental principles in Cruzan, current procedures set forth by NYS favor
ensuring access to aggressive disease-directed therapies and can thereby
impede the fundamental liberty interest of a patient with IDD to be free
of intrusive medical treatment at the end of life. While the authors focus
on one patient in one state, this case illuminates issues and concerns in-
volving all incapacitated patients, which the authors hope will inform dis-
cussions across jurisdictions.
II. CASE
Stephen D.,4 a thirty-year-old man, had been in declining health with
mounting medical problems for one year. At the age of four, he was
struck by a car resulting in traumatic brain injury and quadriplegia. Intel-
lectually disabled and nonverbal, he remained dependent on his parents
for all daily activities. For twenty-six years, Stephen D. had been lovingly
cared for at home by his parents. Multiple medical problems developed
over his lifetime, including a seizure disorder, spastic tetraplegia that re-
quired treatment with a Baclofen intrathecal pump, osteoporosis, scolio-
sis with resulting restrictive lung disease, ulcerative colitis, and the need
for nutritional supplementation through a gastric feeding tube.
New and worsening medical problems included progressive difficulty
swallowing with aspiration, weight loss, severe and recurring Clostridium
difficile colitis, disordered breathing, and periods of apnea. Stephen D.’s
parents recognized his declining well-being in his loss of appetite, chronic
pain from skeletal deformities and muscle spasms, withdrawal from activ-
ities at group programs, disengagement from family life, and indifference
to previous sources of enjoyment such as television.
A sleep medicine evaluation established a diagnosis of advanced cen-
tral and obstructive sleep apnea. Tracheotomy and mechanical ventilation
at night were recommended. The parents recoiled from this recommenda-
tion. They questioned the treatment’s ability to reverse the burdens of
their son’s many medical problems or to improve the declining quality of
his life. Based on his prolonged recovery from previous medical proce-
dures and the agitation caused by only supplemental nasal oxygen, the
parents thought their son would be terrified by tracheotomy, mechanical
ventilation, and prolonged hospitalization.
Primary care and consulting physicians supported the parents’ wish to
reject surgery and mechanical ventilation for their son. An order to
forego intubation and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) was unani-
mously viewed by the treatment teams as consistent with the parents’
judgment about their son’s best interest. To implement such a medical
order in NYS, a concurrence of the Office for Persons with Developmen-
tal Disabilities (OPWDD) was required. Before this process could be
completed, Stephen D. developed pneumonia and sepsis. His parents
4. The authors acknowledge and thank the mother of Stephen D. for permission to
share her son’s story. Note, Stephen D. is a pseudonym.
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were determined to avoid hospitalization because of their son’s previous
severe distress in hospitals and their belief that CPR and its consequences
would be excessively burdensome.
Antibiotics and morphine were provided at home, where managing
their son’s condition soon became overwhelming. Upon medical advice,
the parents brought their son to a hospital emergency department where
pneumonia and sepsis were confirmed. The parents were given the option
to admit their son to the intensive care unit for intubation and mechanical
ventilation or to take their son home against medical advice. No alterna-
tive options between these two extremes were available because it was
not possible to obtain OPWDD concurrence over the weekend. Wishing
to emphasize their son’s comfort, the parents chose to return home de-
spite having limited medical and nursing support. Hospice services were
unavailable in the absence of a concurring OPWDD decision about goals
of care. The emergency department notified Adult Protective Services
(APS) of the parents’ decision to take their son home against medical
advice. As a result, police were contacted by APS and visited the family
home to attempt to persuade the parents to bring their son back to the
hospital. Stephen D. died at home about fifteen hours later. The family
called 911, and the police returned to investigate, treating Stephen D.’s
deathbed as a potential crime scene. The parents contended with the
threat of criminal charges until the county medical examiner determined
that the cause of death was pneumonia.
III. DISCUSSION
It is well recognized that patients with capacity have the legal right to
consent to or to refuse to consent to any and all treatment options, in-
cluding life-sustaining treatment (LST).5 This guarantee is founded on re-
spect for the patient’s right of self-determination, often identified as
respect for autonomy.6 Self-determination and the authority to consent to
or refuse treatment requires capacity to understand and evaluate.7 The
right of patients to refuse LST, however, is not absolute. States have in-
terests that sometimes allow the infringement of individual rights.8 The
state’s interest in preserving life is particularly strong, encompassing two
5. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 221; Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957); Salgo
v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1101–02
(Kan. 1960); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663–64 (N.J. 1976).
6. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780.
7. See id. (“True consent to what happens to one’s self is the informed exercise of a
choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available
and the risks attendant upon each.”).
8. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); In re Spring,
405 N.E.2d 115, 123 (Mass. 1980); Comm’r of Corr. v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Mass.
1979); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass.
1977); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 339 (Minn. 1984); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 743
(Wash. 1983); Carol Ann Calabrese, Comment, In re Storar: The Right to Die and Incompe-
tent Patients, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 1087, 1092 (1982).
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concerns: interest in protecting the individual life in question and interest
in promoting the value of human life in general.9 In Cruzan, the Supreme
Court reconfirmed a capacitated patient’s authority to forgo LST even
when the state asserts an interest in protecting that patient’s life.10
When patients lack the capacity for self-determination, particular states
disagree on the best process to both safeguard the interests of the individ-
ual patient and promote other state interests. NYS distinguishes the deci-
sion-making processes for the previously capacitated and the never
capacitated.11 This distinction reveals discriminatory beliefs about the
never capacitated patient and results in disparate treatment, disrespect
for the moral authority of the family, and misdirected state involvement.
A. INCAPACITATED PATIENTS
How a patient who lacks the capacity to make medical decisions can be
autonomous and self-determining is a complex consideration. Scholars
have argued that patients who lack capacity are not autonomous; there-
fore, respecting the autonomy of an incapacitated patient is impossible.12
Courts often strain logic discussing autonomy and self-determination. For
example, a New Jersey court reasoned “that the right of self-determina-
tion should not be lost merely because an individual is unable to sense a
violation of it.”13 In Cruzan, the United States Supreme Court did not
recognize the patient’s autonomy, but rather considered the constitution-
ality of a state regulation to verify the patient’s previously expressed
wishes.14 In the absence of a specific and relevant advance directive, con-
sistent with Cruzan, the role of the surrogate is not to promote the pa-
tient’s autonomy but rather to demonstrate respect for the patient’s
previously expressed values and preferences by making decisions in ac-
cord with those values and preferences.15 Cruzan explicitly did not create
9. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 459.055 (West 2018).
10. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286–87 (1980). In matters of
public health or security, courts may preference the interest of the state over the interest of
the individual. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905); Myers, 399 N.E.2d at
455–56.
11. For a detailed analysis of, and argument to consolidate, existing NYS surrogacy
laws, see N.Y. TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDING
THE FAMILY HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT TO INCLUDE HEALTH CARE DECISIONS FOR
PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES AND PATIENTS IN OR TRANSFERRED FROM
MENTAL HEALTH FACILITIES 4–5 (2016), https://www.health.ny.gov/regulations/task_force/
reports_publications/docs/2016-06_recommendations_for_amending_fhcda.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M7SL-JKQY].
12. Daniel Brudney, Choosing for Another: Beyond Autonomy and Best Interests, 39
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 31, 34 (2009).
13. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 273 (citing In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229–33 (N.J. 1985));
see also Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 50–51 (1990) (substituted judgment, even when supported by
evidence of the patient’s wishes, purports to promote the patient’s right of self-determina-
tion precisely when the patient lacks the capacity for self-determination around medical
decisions).
14. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
15. Brudney, supra note 12, at 36. Surrogate decision makers can have significantly
different evidence about the previous expressions of choice and wishes. The goal is to
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a constitutional requirement that the state recognize the authority of a
family decision maker.16 Nonetheless, the authors suggest the state’s in-
terest in safeguarding the welfare of the incapacitated is best achieved,
whenever possible, by giving primacy to family members’ understanding
of the patient’s lived experience.17
B. THE MORAL AUTHORITY OF THE FAMILY
In In re Quinlan, the Supreme Court of New Jersey granted a father
the right to discontinue life-sustaining respirator support on behalf of his
daughter, a previously capacitated adult patient.18 In that case, founda-
tional to the development of the rights of surrogates under the Constitu-
tion, both the lower court and the Supreme Court of New Jersey
concluded that the evidence of the patient’s wishes “lacked significant
probative weight” and was insufficient to determine “what she would
want done in such a contingency as now exists.”19 Unable to rely on the
doctrines of informed consent and substituted judgment as they existed,
the court nonetheless recognized the moral authority of the family over
the objections of the doctors and the State.20 Without evidence of the
patient’s moral views, the New Jersey court determined the father to be
the appropriate surrogate to express the moral views of the patient re-
garding respirator support.21 The language of the decision indicates the
court agreed with the remedy sought by the father.22
Not all state courts have been inclined to recognize the moral authority
of family to make medical decisions for incapacitated patients. For exam-
ple, in In re Storar, the New York Court of Appeals denied a devoted
mother the authority to refuse LST on behalf of her son.23 Because the
patient never had capacity to make medical decisions, the court asserted
that “it is unrealistic to attempt to determine whether he would want to
continue potentially life prolonging treatment if he were competent.”24
make the decision the patient would make under the circumstances. Daniel Brudney ar-
gues for the need to respect both self-determination and authenticity of the patient. Id.
Authenticity sometimes “involve false beliefs, poor reasoning, and so forth.” Id.
16. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286.
17. Id. (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131–32 (1989); Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584, 620 (1979)).
18. 355 A.2d 647, 671 (N.J. 1976).
19. Id. at 653.
20. Id. at 671. The court also put limitations on this authority, requiring the physicians
and, oddly, a hospital ethics committee to conclude that there was no reasonable possibility
Quinlan would emerge “from her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient
state . . . .” Id.
21. Id. at 664.
22. Id. at 662. The language of the decision indicates the court was deeply troubled by
the condition of the patient. Id. at 657–58 (complimentary of the moral decision-making
process by the father); id. at 664 (observing, without citing supportive evidence, the “over-
whelming majority” of members of society would make the same decision under similar
circumstances).
23. In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73 (N.Y. 1981). For another example, see In re Joseph
P., 966 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
24. Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 72.
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One can differentiate Quinlan and Storar by the characterization of the
status of the patients—one patient was previously capacitated and the
other was never capacitated. However, this characterization would fail to
acknowledge that the Quinlan court found the evidence of previously ex-
pressed wishes to be insufficient.25 The differences in these cases include
what the respective courts deemed to be an undesirable outcome: in
Quinlan, the court decided that life was undesirable,26 and in Storar, the
court concluded that death was undesirable.27 Both of these determina-
tions are value-based. When there is disagreement on the rightness of
outcomes based upon values, how decisions are made becomes especially
important.
When unable to rely upon the doctrines of informed consent and sub-
stituted judgment, the surrogate is to make the decision that is in the
patient’s “best interest.” The best interest standard was historically in-
tended to be objective and represent what the reasonable person would
decide. Influences on these decisions, however, are intensely personal
and are often grounded in values and beliefs rather than logic alone. The
circumstances and time in which one lives inform these values and beliefs.
Early decisions relying on the best interest standard authorized medical
interventions, since the alternative of death was not considered prefera-
ble.28 Advances in medical technologies, such as the respirator support
used in the care of the patient in Quinlan, caused some to consider limita-
tions on use of LSTs.29
Today, it is understood that reasonable people may disagree about
what is in their best interest in identical clinical situations. Therefore,
there is no single response to the question of what is in a patient’s best
interest. In Cruzan, the Supreme Court recognized the authority of the
State to create procedural rules for adjudication of questions about the
scope of surrogate decision-making while citing previous decisions that
upheld the constitutionality of the State’s “favored treatment of tradi-
tional family relationships.”30 The State of Missouri required the family
to present “clear and convincing” evidence of the patient’s previous
wishes when making decisions about forgoing any LST.31 In requiring the
surrogate to find and rely upon evidence of the patient’s previously
known values, perspectives, and wishes, the Court attempted to demon-
strate respect for the individual. Daniel Brudney, citing Ronald Dworkin,
argues that demonstrating respect for the “integrity” and “authenticity”
of each person is the central moral obligation in surrogate decision-mak-
25. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 653.
26. Id. at 663.
27. Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 73.
28. See, e.g., id.
29. See, e.g., Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 671–72.
30. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286 (1980) (citing Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979)).
31. Id. at 280.
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ing.32 The question the authors address is how to best meet this
obligation.
C. STATE INVOLVEMENT
Following Cruzan, NYS created multiple laws and regulations gov-
erning medical decision-making for adult patients who lack capacity.33
The laws regulating medical decisions for individuals with IDD establish
substantive and procedural limitations on the decision-making role of
family surrogates. The existence of these legal safeguards arises from his-
torical evidence of abuse and neglect of people with disabilities.34 Under
NYS common law, persons with mental retardation could not refuse LST,
nor could a surrogate decision maker refuse LST on their behalf.35 This
led some family members of persons with IDD to seek legislative relief
for painful and intrusive LSTs that a person with capacity might reasona-
bly decide to forgo.36 In response, NYS passed the Health Care Decisions
Act for Persons with Mental Retardation (HCDA) in 2003, expanding the
rights of guardians to make health care decisions on behalf of intellectu-
ally incapacitated patients.37
32. Brudney, supra note 12, at 35 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION (First
Vintage Book ed., 1994)).
33. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2960–2994, 2994-aa–2994-gg (McKinney 2019);
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 80.01–.13 (McKinney 2019); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT
§1750-b (McKinney 2019); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, §§ 27.9, 527. 8, 633.11
(2019); N.Y. TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, supra note 11, at 4–7.
34. See David J. Rothman & Sheila M. Rothman, The Litigator as Reformer, in
MENTAL RETARDATION IN AMERICA: A HISTORICAL READER 445, 445–46 (Steven Noll &
James W. Trent Jr. eds., 2004). The Willowbrook State School in NYS is often cited as a
particularly egregious example of mistreatment of institutional residents. See Walter M.
Robinson & Brandon T. Unruh, The Hepatitis Experiments at the Willowbrook State
School, in THE OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL RESEARCH ETHICS 80, 80 (Ezekiel J.
Emanuel et al. eds., 2008). Public outrage at the revelations of abhorrent treatment of
residents at Willowbrook led to legislation specifically designed to protect individuals with
disabilities from similar mistreatment in the future. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN & SHEILA M.
ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS: BRINGING THE MENTALLY DISABLED INTO THE
COMMUNITY 45 (2005). Safeguards against the possibility of family and/or medical miscon-
duct were seen as necessary to prevent abuses of the past. Id. at 151.
35. See In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y. 1981) (noting that the common law re-
quires “clear and convincing” evidence of the patient’s intentions to refuse or withdraw
LSTs); People v. Eulo, 472 N.E.2d 286, 296 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that, absent legislation, a
surrogate does not have the authority to determine a patient’s quality of life is such that
treatment should be withdrawn or withheld); Blouin v. Spitzer, 213 F. Supp. 2d 184, 191
(N.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing In re O’Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 612 (N.Y. 1988) (stating that the
doctrine of informed consent is “personal and, under existing law in this State, [can] not be
exercised by a third party when the patient is unable to do so”)).
36. See In re M.B., 846 N.E.2d 794, 796 (N.Y. 2006).
37. Health Care Decisions Act for Persons with Mental Retardation, ch. 500, § 3, 2002
N.Y. Laws (codified at N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1750-b (McKinney 2019)). Guardian-
ship begins with a diagnosis: two health care providers must determine the individual is
“incapable to manage him or herself and/or his or her affairs by reason of mental retarda-
tion and that such condition is permanent in nature or likely to continue indefinitely.” Id.
Subsequent amendments broadened the scope to encompass people with developmental
disabilities. See, e.g., Act of July 3, 2007, ch. 105, § 1, 2007 N.Y. Laws (codified at N.Y.
SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1750-b). The HCDA recognizes that persons who satisfy the condi-
tions for guardianship may have the ability to make health care decisions. N.Y. SURR. CT.
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Although the HCDA codifies beliefs about the role of family that are
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,”38 recognizing fam-
ily members as natural advocates for adults with IDD, it does so ambiva-
lently. Historical abuses revealed both family members and medical
professionals to be complicit in biases rooted in the devaluation of the
lives of persons with disabilities.39 The HCDA consequently incorporates
limits on the authority of family surrogates.40 Summaries of the law de-
scribe a process that allows the guardian of a person with IDD to make
all health care decisions that the patient could make if they had capacity,
including LST.41 This description is misleading. Patients with capacity can
make decisions about LST in all medical circumstances. The HCDA, in
contrast, regulates a guardian or qualified family member’s ability to
make the same decisions on behalf of a patient with IDD by a burden-
some and discriminatory process. It allows the refusal or withdrawal of
LST only under limited medical conditions.42 The law places an affirma-
tive obligation on the surrogate “to advocate for the full and efficacious
provision of health care, including life-sustaining treatment.”43 While the
HCDA attempted to balance the competing interests of respecting the
dignity of the individual and protecting the individual from discrimina-
tory decisions, the law strongly favors the prolongation of life over deci-
sions to withhold LST.
In re Joseph P.44 illustrates the application of the NYS laws. Joseph P.
was a fifty-five-year-old man with profound IDD who lived in a group
home.45 Other medical problems included cerebral palsy, spinal curva-
ture, and spastic quadriplegia.46 When hospitalized for aspiration pneu-
monia caused by dysphagia, his parents—who were his legal guardians—
withheld consent for placement of a feeding tube.47 The attending physi-
cian and chief medical officer of the hospital where Joseph P. was being
treated supported the parents’ decision.48 In compliance with NYS law,
the hospital notified the OPWDD of the decision to withhold LST.49
Concurring physicians stated that the proposed feeding tube would con-
stitute an “extraordinary burden” on the patient because he would have
difficulty with the necessary reassignment from his group home where he
PROC. ACT § 1750-b(2). Under these circumstances, the guardian is appointed for the pur-
pose of making other kinds of decisions, such as financial, educational, or housing deci-
sions. Id. § 1750.
38. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion).
39. See infra note 34.
40. See § 1750–b(1).
41. NYS OFFICE FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, HEALTH CARE
CHOICES: WHO CAN DECIDE? 13–16 (2012), https://opwdd.ny.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/Health_Care_Choices_2_14_Layout_5.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7L8-RA7N].
42. See supra Table 1.
43. § 1750-b.
44. 966 N.Y.S.2d 622 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
45. Id. at 623.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 623–24.
49. See id. at 624.
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had been a resident for twenty-seven years.50 He also would likely need
to be restrained to prevent his removal of the feeding tube, and he would
regularly need deep suctioning which is very uncomfortable.51 Finally, the
feeding tube would not address the underlying “medical condition
that . . . is irreversible and . . . will continue indefinitely.”52 OPWDD
objected to the decision and filed a lawsuit to compel insertion of the
feeding tube. The New York trial court held the parents met the statutory
criteria (extraordinary burden) for refusal of LST and denied the state
agency’s petition to authorize surgical insertion of a feeding tube.53 The
only question before the court of appeals was whether or not the “bur-
den” of the treatment on the patient was “extraordinary.”54
NYS requires the same “clear and convincing” standard as Missouri
that was upheld in Cruzan.55 The New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, held the parents failed to establish by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the treatment would impose an extraordinary burden on their
son.56 The court based the decision on the testimony of a physician and
nurse at the OPWDD group home who reported that Joseph P. had been
alert and seemingly pain free in his life before hospitalization and thought
the future burdens of life with a feeding tube did not “outweigh any plea-
sure, emotional enjoyment or other satisfaction that he may yet be able to
derive from life.”57
The case of Stephen D., presented above, again demonstrates how safe-
guards in NYS laws governing refusal of LST for persons with IDD may
override the judgment of family and court-appointed guardians regarding
best interests. In Stephen D.’s case, OPWDD did not review the parental
decision to withhold intubation and CPR because the medical problem
arose acutely and OPWDD review could not be initiated rapidly enough
on a weekend. Hospital physicians were aware of legal requirements to
obtain OPWDD assent to a plan to forgo LST for individuals with IDD,
and the physicians informed Stephen D.’s parents that, if hospitalized,
Stephen D. would need intubation and full critical care measures. Even if
timely OPWDD review had been available, the possibility existed that
OPWDD would reject the parents’ decision and a legal process, as in the
case of Joseph P., would ensue. This outcome was unacceptable to Ste-
phen D.’s parents who felt their first responsibility was to protect their
son from unwarranted suffering and excessively burdensome medical
care.
50. See id. at 624–25.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 624.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265 (1990).
56. Joseph P., 466 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
57. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The historical motivation to protect persons with IDD is understanda-
ble. The NYS laws reflect legislative caution born of that history. Regret-
tably, an unintended consequence of a focus on historical abuses and the
need of the state to protect vulnerable populations can harm persons with
IDD when considering medically appropriate care at the end of life. The
safeguards and limitations of these NYS laws constitute a legal state of
mistrust that clouds the moral agency of family surrogates. The case of
Stephen D. demonstrates the hazards of these restrictions on the execu-
tion of his parental guardians’ obligations and desires to care for their
son. His parents were compelled to make a choice that may have denied
their son optimal end-of-life care in his final hours and that subjected
them to investigation for criminal activity. No previously capacitated NYS
resident or their family would have been subject to this scrutiny, suspi-
cion, or denial of access to medically necessary care.
Different well-intentioned, caring surrogates may reach different con-
clusions about their incapacitated family member’s best interest. Joseph
P.’s parental guardians thought that placement of a gastric feeding tube
would prove excessively burdensome.58 Physicians at the hospital treating
him for aspiration pneumonia agreed, as did the trial court.59 The appel-
late court, however, overruled the decision on the strength of conflicting
testimony from a nurse and a physician at the patient’s OPWDD group
home.60 Both opinions might well be “reasonable” under such complex
circumstances. Conscientious efforts at assessing an incapacitated per-
son’s best interest may result in different conclusions. However, there is
no good reason to favor the state’s authority in these decisions over com-
mitted and responsible family. Rather, family may be in the best position
to apply available knowledge of an incapacitated individual’s experience
and preferences that may have bearing on medical decisions. It is discrim-
inatory to recognize the natural role of family as surrogate decision mak-
ers for incapacitated individuals but then create distinctive obstacles to
their informed judgments on behalf of people with IDD.
Decisions about medical care for the terminally and critically ill can be
extremely challenging. Physicians will often disagree about their patient’s
prognosis and best interest. The complex clinical and moral decisions for
patients who lack capacity to be fully self-determining can be addressed
through recognition of the natural justification for family to act as surro-
gates. This is true of parental authority in making end-of-life decisions for
children in medically fraught circumstances, as well as for adults who
have lost capacity. The same should be true for the family and guardians
who act as surrogates for the never capacitated community of persons
with IDD.
58. See Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities
and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 395–96 (1986).
59. Joseph P., 466 N.Y.S.2d at 264.
60. Id. at 265.
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In cases where the patient lacks capacity, it is necessary to determine
both who is the appropriate surrogate decision maker and what kinds of
medical decisions the surrogate has the authority to make. It also is im-
portant to consider how surrogates are to make the decisions. Histori-
cally, courts failed to consider that individuals with IDD were capable of
making decisions or having values, beliefs, or preferences worthy of con-
sideration. Although in some instances this is true, this categorical deter-
mination is prejudicial. Individuals with IDD perform a wide range of
daily activities requiring decisions which reflect how they want to live.61
The Cruzan Court concluded the State could defer to the patient’s
wishes and set standards to govern determination of her wishes.62 The
Court also cited previous decisions that upheld the constitutionality of
the State’s “favored treatment of traditional family relationships.”63 To
fully respect incapacitated individuals and realize the claims in the
HCDA, NYS would need to promote self-determination in patients with
IDD where possible and allow the intentions and preferences of such in-
dividuals to inform medical decision-making on their behalf. Prioritizing
“empirical evidence about what individuals value and how they make de-
cisions,” rather than asking what is in another’s “best interest,” demon-
strates respect for the individual.64
OPWDD or other agencies in NYS and elsewhere, charged with the
welfare of the community of persons with IDD, should have recourse to
legal remedies if there is strong evidence of surrogate decisions that jus-
tify suspicion of surrogate maleficence or misconduct. There should not,
however, be a process that defaults to aggressive interventions at the end
of life even when legally recognized family surrogates provide evidence
of patient values and preferences to the contrary.
61. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae, The American Association on Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD), and the ARC of the United States, in Support of
Petitioner at 13, Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017); see also The Right to Sexuality,
ATLANTIC (June 14, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/video/index/591280/disability-con-
sent/ [https://perma.cc/37KW-QASM].
62. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284 (1980).
63. Id. at 286 (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131–32 (1989); Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 620 (1979)).
64. Daniel P. Sulmasy & Lois Snyder, Substituted Interest and Best Judgments: An Inte-
grated Model of Surrogate Decision Making, 304 JAMA 1946, 1946–47 (2010).
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TABLE 1
A Summary of Health Care Decisions for Persons Who Are
Intellectually Disabled, N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT
§ 750-b (McKinney 2019).
When a surrogate for a patient with an IDD expresses a decision to 
withdraw or withhold LST, the attending physician, after confirming the 
patient lacks capacity to make medical decisions, must consult with a 
second physician or licensed psychologist to confirm the patient’s lack 
of capacity. Either the attending physician or the consultant must 
possess specialized training or have experience in providing services to 
the intellectually disabled. In addition, the attending physician and the 
consultant must determine that both of the following conditions exist:  
(1) the person with disabilities has a medical condition as follows:  
(a) a terminal condition, which means “an illness or injury 
from which there is no recovery, and which reasonably can 
be expected to cause death within one year,” N.Y. PUB. 
HEALTH LAW § 2961 (McKinney 2018); or 
(b) permanent unconsciousness; or 
(c) a medical condition other than such person’s disabilities 
which requires LST, is irreversible and which will continue 
indefinitely; and 
(2) the LST would impose an extraordinary burden on the person, 
in light of:  
(a) the person’s medical condition, other than the person’s 
disabilities; and 
(b) the expected outcome of the LST, notwithstanding the 
person’s disabilities.  
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In the case of a decision to withdraw or withhold artificially provided 
nutrition or hydration, one of the following additional factors must also 
be met:  
(1) there is no reasonable hope of maintaining life; or 
(2) the artificially provided nutrition or hydration poses an 
extraordinary burden.  
The law requires notification, at least forty-eight hours before 
implementation or at the earliest possible time, to (1) the patient (unless 
such notification would cause injury); (2) the executive director of the 
agency operating the facility, if the patient lived in an OPWDD 
operated or certified residential facility and the Mental Hygiene Legal 
Services (MHLS); or (3) the Commissioner of OPWDD, if the patient 
did not reside in such a facility. 
The law also established seven categories of people who can object to a 
guardian or qualified family member’s decision regarding the 
withholding or withdrawal of LST. These include (1) the patient; (2) a 
parent or adult sibling who either resides with the patient or “has 
maintained substantial and continuous contact” with the patient; (3) the 
attending physician; (4) any other member of the health care team; 
(5) the executive director of the agency operating the patient’s 
residential facility; (6) the MHLS; or (7) the Commissioner of OPWDD. 
The surrogate’s decision is suspended if any of the notified parties 
object and the case proceeds to either a nonbinding dispute mediation 
process or court review. 
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